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UNNATURAL HISTORY
A
fter a comparative lull in the 1990s, when free-market 
propagandists announced the imminent realization of the 
best of all possible worlds, dramatic ecological warnings have 
once again taken centre stage in the news media. Now that 
there is an overwhelming consensus among scientists, politicians and 
journalists that the rise in temperatures can no longer be regarded as one 
of the normal, periodic ﬂuctuations in the earth’s climate, a new natural 
history seems to be in the making: from sandstorms sweeping through 
Beijing to constantly ﬂooding rivers in Central Europe, from melting 
polar ice-caps to rising sea-levels, there is no shortage of natural events 
that seem disturbingly unnatural. Climate change, however, is merely 
the most dramatic of a number of developments—genetic technology 
being another—that change nature to an unprecedented degree.
In a situation in which nature is apparently being changed through 
human interventions while, conversely, human culture is increasingly 
dominated by this new nature, it is of crucial importance to reconsider 
the relationship between natural and human history, and to arrive at a 
more historicized conception of nature than occurs in popular science 
discourse—which naturalizes culture by focusing on the unchanging, 
animal side of the ‘naked ape’. There have been some attempts to do 
this—notably by Francis Fukuyama, who in 1989 appropriated Kojève’s 
appropriation of Hegel to proclaim the end of history, but now observes 
that ‘there can be no end of history without an end of modern natural 
science and technology’.1 History reasserts itself in the form of genetic 
research, which alters human nature itself, raising numerous questions 
about human rights and citizenship. While many either celebrate or fret 
about ‘our posthuman future’, to quote the title of Fukuyama’s 2002 
book, others have sought to chart, as it were, our human non-future; 
examples include Al Gore’s ﬁlm An Inconvenient Truth and Nicholas 
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Stern’s report for the uk Treasury on climate change. For ecological col-
lapse threatens the survival, if not of our species, then at least of the 
current social order.
Both attempts at historicization are, however, limited by their general 
adherence to a liberal conception of history, in which the ideal marriage 
of a democratic nation-state and a capitalist economy is still the ultimate 
goal, the only desirable future. While the Stern report emphasizes the 
need for forms of planning and regulation, for instance through carbon 
trading schemes, others maintain that the economic regime that caused 
the problem—or at least signiﬁcantly contributed to it—will also provide 
the cure. If increased pollution is indeed a by-product of the incredible 
inventiveness set free by capitalism, capitalism will also create the means 
of ﬁghting pollution, giving rise to cleaner and less wasteful forms of 
production and consumption. There are opportunities for growth even 
in the green sector. In this way, the new nature is reintegrated in the 
symbolic ediﬁce, as capitalism once more proves its adaptability.
In his early essay on ‘The Idea of Natural History’, Theodor Adorno 
stated that ‘the question of the relationship between nature and history 
only stands a chance of being answered when one succeeds in under-
standing historical being, even in its utmost historical determinacy, as a 
natural [naturhaftes] being, or in grasping nature as historical being, even 
where it is apparently most resistant and static.’2 Adorno notes that he uses 
‘nature’ as more or less synonymous with ‘myth’, both terms standing 
for life in the grip of fate, subject to fear, before humanity asserted con-
trol over nature.3 Current discourse, inﬂected by popularizers of Darwin, 
to some extent follows Adorno’s deconstruction of the identiﬁcation of 
nature with dumb, mythical being: nature is itself already historical. 
But whereas Adorno also argued that human history results in another 
nature, in a return of myth, contemporary conceptualizations of the 
new, unnatural natural history often avoid probing the deadlocks of a 
culture still absorbing the shockwaves of the new nature. These omis-
sions work to undermine possibilities for radical change, even while 
signalling imminent collapse. On the rare occasions when historical 
changes in nature are noted in today’s discourse, these are integrated 
1 Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology 
Revolution, New York 2002, p. 15.
2 Theodor Adorno, ‘Die Idee der Naturgeschichte’ [1933], in Adorno, Gesammelte 
Schriften, vol. 1, Frankfurt am Main 1973, pp. 354–5; emphasis in original.
3 Adorno, ‘Idee der Naturgeschichte’, p. 345.
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into the ‘natural being’ of the current regime, rather than used to ques-
tion its quasi-natural status.
The musings of liberal authors such as Jared Diamond are typical in 
this respect: comparing ‘ecocides’ in various historical and contempo-
rary societies, Diamond tries to draw lessons that can be applied to the 
approaching global ecological disaster, but his comparative approach and 
focus on social, biological and psychological invariants robs the current 
situation of much of its speciﬁcity. In the end we are only left with con-
soling ‘examples of courageous leaders and courageous people’ who did 
the right thing.4 For today’s liberals, the collapse of the existing order can 
solely be imagined in biological and ecological terms; social and political 
change can only take the form of minor adjustments. Even an author as 
concerned and informed as Diamond is unable to think beyond this limit. 
The free market or ‘liberal democracy’ appears as a second nature whose 
collapse would be more dramatic than that of the physical environment. 
Within these constraints, however, dark scenarios can still emerge. In 
2006, Oliver Curry, lse-based editor of Darwinism Today, predicted that 
100,000 years into the future, the human race will be divided into two 
separate races—termed ‘gracile’ and ‘robust’. As the bbc reported, ‘the 
descendants of the genetic upper class would be tall, slim, healthy, attrac-
tive, intelligent, creative, and a far cry from the “underclass” humans who 
would have evolved into dim-witted, ugly, squat goblin-like creatures.’5 
While this breeding fantasy in the spirit of H. G. Wells’s Morlocks and 
Eloi makes no explicit reference to genetic engineering, it is clear that 
one of the elite’s advantages is having access to advanced technology in 
this and other ﬁelds. In spite—or because—of its delusional qualities, 
the ‘two races’ scenario shows the limits of well-meaning liberal narra-
tives, in which the means of containing threats to the current order are 
seen to lie in that very order. Its bluntness at least has the advantage of 
making explicit what remains hidden in paeans to the problem-solving 
power of capitalism: in an age of collapse, the odds are far from even, 
both within Western societies and on a global scale.
Contemporary culture is often branded ahistorical, seen as marked by 
repetitious vogues and industrial nostalgia. This condition seems now to 
4 Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed, New York 2005, 
p. 440.
5 ‘Human species “may split in two”’, bbc News website, 17 October 2006.
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have dissipated, with history reasserting itself as natural history in a period 
of global political and economic turmoil. But despite the consensus that 
global warming cannot be ascribed to normal ﬂuctuations in the earth’s 
temperature, the human and therefore social and political components 
of this process have been minimized; man-made nature is re-naturalized, 
the new (un)natural history presented as fate. The truly terrifying notion 
is not that it is irreversible, but that it actually might be reversible—at 
the cost of radically changing the economic and social order.
Awful changes
A major point of reference in Adorno’s ‘The Idea of Natural History’ 
is Benjamin’s work on the Trauerspiel, in which the latter attributed to 
Baroque drama a conception of history as a process of ruin, subject to 
elementary forces of nature. It is telling that Benjamin draws a paral-
lel between Baroque and Romanticism as the two great anti-Classicist 
tendencies. At the turn of the nineteenth century, the Baroque ﬁxation 
on Vergänglichkeit—a notion of transience that had served as a religious 
memento mori—was transformed into the scientiﬁc investigation of 
nature as liable to dramatic change.6 This period saw a radical historici-
zation of nature and the abandonment of Biblical chronology in favour 
of what would later be termed ‘deep time’—a long natural history pre-
ceding the emergence of the human race, populated by creatures that 
were reconstructed by Georges Cuvier, William Buckland and others. 
‘Natural time’ was no longer that of seasonal cycles; such returns 
were now plotted on a historical axis of previously unimaginable scale. 
However, this axis in turn was beset by cataclysmic convulsions that sug-
gested a repetitive pattern. Human culture itself was now a potential 
ruin; at the end of the century, H. G. Wells would send his time traveller 
to the post-human future of the Morlocks and Eloi. Past stages of life 
were also brought to life again, in phantasmal scenes of deep time cre-
ated by artists and writers.7
6 Adorno, ‘Idee der Naturgeschichte’, pp. 357–8; Walter Benjamin, ‘Ursprung des 
deutschen Trauerspiels’ [1928], in Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1, part 1, 
Frankfurt am Main 1991, pp. 352–3.
7 On deep time iconography, see Stephen Jay Gould, Time’s Arrow/Time’s Cycle: 
Myth and Metaphor in the Discovery of Geological Time, Cambridge, ma and London 
1987; Martin Rudwick, Scenes from Deep Time: Early Pictorial Representations of the 
Prehistoric World, Chicago and London 1992.
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Among the many nineteenth-century visualizations of ‘antediluvian’ 
scenes, Henry de la Beche’s 1830 illustration of various ichthyosaurs 
and other prehistoric creatures engaged in a proto-Darwinist struggle 
for life was particularly inﬂuential. In a clear and humorous style that 
others would soon abandon in favour of heavy drama, de la Beche—who 
was part of the geological and paleontological vanguard of the period—
depicted a prehistoric dog-eat-dog world, a marine orgy of hyperactive 
beaks and writhing bodies, in which no animal ever seems to have a 
moment of rest.8 In its more garish versions, this iconography became 
popular from the 1840s onwards, also occurring in literature: a similar 
battle takes place in Jules Verne’s Journey to the Centre of the Earth (1864) 
while the heroes are crossing an underground lake—past moments of 
deep time preserved in the bowels of the earth.9 In Arthur Conan Doyle’s 
The Lost World and its 1922 ﬁlm adaptation, dinosaurs have survived 
through the ages on an isolated plateau; in King Kong—essentially Lost 
World with an added ape—they live on a remote island.
Such ﬁctions, in which dinosaurs and other prehistoric animals turn 
out to be less than extinct, can be related to a well-known satirical exam-
ple of deep-time iconography, again by Henry de la Beche. Its heading 
announces ‘Awful changes’, and it shows a ‘Professor Ichthyosaurus’ 
lecturing to his fellow creatures about a human skull, said to have 
‘belonged to some of the lower orders of animals’. This 1830 cartoon 
of the ‘Reappearance of Ichthyosauri’ was once thought to refer to the 
famous geologist William Buckland, but Stephen Jay Gould has shown 
that it is a barb aimed at Charles Lyell, who advocated a cyclic model 
for the earth’s history in the early editions of his inﬂuential Principles 
of Geology.10 Lyell refused to accept that the geological records suggest 
directionality—an evolution of species from the simple to the more 
complex, with certain species becoming extinct. He argued that while 
environmental shifts might cause periodic changes in the fauna of a 
region, none were ﬁnal. In the passage lampooned by de la Beche, Lyell 
claimed that creatures very similar to the ichthyosaurs, and dinosaurs 
8 Rudwick, Scenes from Deep Time, pp. 64–7; while de la Beche’s depiction of 
ancient Dorset—Duria antiquor—is certainly whimsical, Rudwick’s description 
of the image as ‘cheerful’ and ‘neoclassical’ plays down the Hoffmannesque and 
uncanny qualities of the image, which must have been even more pronounced for 
viewers unaccustomed to seeing prehistoric animals.
9 See David Standish, Hollow Earth, Cambridge, ma 2006, pp. 132–236.
10 Gould, Time’s Arrow, pp. 89–179.
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whose skeletons were being discovered on the Dorset coast and in 
quarries, might yet live in remote parts of the world—and might show 
up again in England when conditions once more suited them.
Lost worlds
The non-directional vision that Lyell attempted to impose on deep time 
could be seen as a répétition du mythe, a regressive reassertion of a cyclic 
worldview, as Benjamin characterized nineteenth-century theories of 
eternal return, Nietzsche’s foremost among them.11 But Nietzsche’s 
idea was itself a late, Pythagorean version of the cyclical conception of 
time, which modern mythologists such as Eliade identiﬁed with tradi-
tional societies. Eliade argues that the latter managed to keep the ‘terror 
of history’ at bay by conceiving of time as the cyclic repetition of arche-
types, of events and symbols belonging to a primeval period when gods 
or mythic ancestors walked the earth. In Ancient Greece, pre-Socratic 
thinkers—the Pythagoreans foremost—radicalized this approach with 
the notion that everything will eternally recur; every moment in effect 
becomes an archetype that will return countless times.12 However, 
Nietzsche concluded that ancient Pythagorean notions of eternal repeti-
tion are hardly applicable to historical events, which are in many ways 
speciﬁc and unique. A genuine repetition of such events would only 
be possible if the earth were to start its ‘drama’ anew after the ﬁrst 
act; this is what the later Nietzsche gambled on with his doctrine of 
the eternal return.13
Nietzsche’s struggle with the notion of an eternal return had started in 
the early 1870s, as he was reﬂecting precisely on the nineteenth centu-
ry’s infatuation with history. He speculated that historicism might yet 
prove to be productive; if one realized that the Renaissance had been cre-
ated by a mere hundred men, such a breakthrough might be repeated. 
Deleuze argued that Nietzsche’s ‘abysmal’ notion of the eternal return 
takes the concept to its extreme, emphasizing that eternal recurrence 
not based on mythic archetypes can only lead to signs without referent, 
11 Walter Benjamin, Das Passagen-Werk [1927–40], in Gesammelte Schriften, vol 5, 
part 1, Frankfurt am Main 1991, pp. 177–8.
12 Mircea Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return: Cosmos and History [1954], Princeton 
2005, pp. 89, 119–23.
13 Friedrich Nietzsche, Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen ii: Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil 
der Historie für das Leben [1874], in Nietzsche, Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe, vol 3, 
part 1, Berlin 1972, p. 237.
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and hence to difference.14 While modern culture ‘remythiﬁes’ repetition 
by using either speciﬁc historical models or clichéd templates that func-
tion as industrial archetypes, its quasi-cyclic recurrence is not a closed 
system. Under the impact of historical shocks, the repetitions of mass 
culture may produce unnatural mutations that serve as signs and por-
tents of change—as exempliﬁed by recurrent motifs of nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century deep-time ﬁction. 
Doyle’s The Lost World might initially be seen as a ﬁctional realization of 
Lyell’s myth of eternal return—in a climate beﬁtting them, and cut off 
from their enemies, dinosaurs have indeed survived. However, the ideo-
logical subtext is decidedly un-Lyellian. Doyle’s work is deeply ingrained 
with imperialist progressivism: white British explorers ﬁnding a freak 
of nature that gives insight into natural history rather than undermin-
ing history, a time capsule that does not undo directionality. Rather 
than depicting the survival of isolated pockets of deep time, meanwhile, 
Jurassic Park and its sequels show the reconstruction of extinct spe-
cies, courtesy of modern technology. As instances of new, manmade 
nature spinning dangerously out of control, these dinosaurs stand in 
for tsunamis, rising sea levels and desertiﬁcation. Clones of old genetic 
models, the neo-dinosaurs naturalize the unnatural new nature; but the 
fact that they quickly escape from human control suggests that recur-
rence can shatter a given state of affairs. A similar mix of forward- and 
backward-looking elements is to be found in J. G. Ballard’s 1962 novel, 
The Drowned World, which depicts a world being made uninhabitable 
by rising temperatures and sea levels. The cause of this is not science 
gone awry, but a ‘sudden instability of the sun.’15 In this respect, Ballard 
may seem to be looking backward, shying away from addressing man-
made environmental collapse. However, the very fact that the cause of 
environmental change in Ballard’s early novels—including his superior 
The Crystal World—is utterly uncontrollable, and sometimes unknown, 
creates an uncanny sense of an unnatural history in the making.
Such deep-time fantasies, which restore historicity to nature by means of 
cyclical returns, are an obvious source for current discourse on climate 
change. Scenarios of the future are riddled with ideological ﬁctions; 
14 Gilles Deleuze, Différence et répétition, Paris 1968. Deleuze was building on the 
brilliant essays of Pierre Klossowski in Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle [1969], 
London 2005.
15 J. G. Ballard, The Drowned World [1962], London 1999, p. 70.
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many, in fact, try to marshal the power of these ﬁctions for their pur-
poses. Ballard’s vision of a future half-submerged London has cinematic 
offspring that include Waterworld (1995) and Kubrick/Spielberg’s A.I. 
(2001), as well as Al Gore’s depiction of New York being inundated. 
Gore and others make pragmatic use of deep-time ﬁction to try to make 
‘us’ aware of the risks of our Western lifestyle, if we do not mend our 
ways (though we should remain loyal consumers in order to keep the 
economy going). But they refrain from foregrounding and question-
ing their own status. Content to dramatize the dangerous direction in 
which nature is heading due to human interventions, they nonetheless 
view these interventions as speciﬁc practices that cause pollution, and 
only marginally or intermittently as symptoms of a society as thoroughly 
unstable as the new nature they seek to address. They thus offer no fun-
damental alternative to the suggestion that the course taken by nature 
due to human activities is as inevitable and unchangeable as the trajec-
tory of society itself.
Social disasters are naturalized and ‘natural’ disasters are seen as man-
made but not open to intervention—society in turn being perceived as 
subject to quasi-natural fatality. In this context, the time of capitalist moder-
nity unfolds as a dialectic of cataclysmic repetitions and a linearity whose 
apparent inevitability is itself mythical, as Benjamin saw very clearly. If 
the culture industry’s repetitions can register and suggest change, then 
change itself becomes another form of mythical fate, distributing wealth 
and health to some, disaster to others. Seeing New Orleans destroyed by 
Hurricane Katrina, one need not reach for conspiracy theories concern-
ing the incompetence of the Bush Administration and fema to conclude 
that all parties effectively acted as if trying to cement the belief that both 
nature and society, as second nature, are so far beyond control as to make 
any attempt at intervention an exercise in futility.
Second natures
Both in ‘The Idea of Natural History’ and much later, in Negative Dialectics, 
Adorno relied on the young Lukács’s Marxian reading of the Hegelian 
concept of second nature. This signiﬁed an ‘alienated, dead world’, a rei-
ﬁed representation of impoverished social relationships.16 Here ‘second 
nature’ comes to stand for the ossiﬁed products of human labour, as a 
fetishistic spectacle of apparently autonomous artifacts beyond human 
16 Adorno, ‘Idee der Naturgeschichte’, pp. 355–6.
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control—while ‘ﬁrst nature’ itself, subjected as it is by science, undergoes 
a similar process. If this Lukácsian–Adornian take on second nature dif-
fers from earlier, Idealist uses, these were already varied: whereas Hegel 
remained close to the common meaning of second nature as ‘conven-
tion’, the later Schelling historicized the concept.
‘Second nature’ has a long history as a signiﬁer for ‘convention’, from 
Cicero through to Montaigne and Pascal, but it gained a new meaning, 
and new urgency, with Rousseau—and with the simpliﬁed interpretation 
of Rousseau’s thought as demanding a ‘return to nature’, conceived as a 
state of grace and innocence. In the historical turn of late eighteenth- and 
early nineteenth-century thinking, ‘second nature’ came to be seen—by 
Schiller, among others—as the potential reassertion in human society of 
something resembling the immediacy and harmony of nature, possibly 
with the aid of art.17 Hegel, of course, is strictly against such a conceptu-
alization of second nature. Crucially, for him, the bad immediacy of ‘ﬁrst 
nature’ has been shattered, and there can be no return to it; attempts to 
reform morality and customs ‘in accordance with nature’ are extremely 
dubious. Stating that the system of law is ‘a second nature’ insofar as it 
is not just externally imposed but lived, he considers that das Sittliche—
what is morally just—becomes a Sitte: a custom, second nature. If the 
grip of habit becomes too strong, its effects are negative. Hegel notes 
that ‘man also dies out of habit’, and that Spirit itself is movement, shat-
tering the sameness of nature. Speaking of ancient Egypt, he stresses 
that a state of civilization in which everything is ﬁxed and conventional, a 
comfortably inhabited second nature, is ‘against the nature of the Spirit’; 
it is Spirit’s historical task to shatter such complacent habits.18
Whereas Hegel’s conception of second nature is still indebted to its old 
meaning of ‘convention’, Schelling effectively uses ‘second nature’ as a 
synonym for Spirit and its historical unfolding. As Schelling puts it in 
the ﬁnal version of the Philosophy of Mythology, human history amounts 
to a second creation.19 Nature pales in comparison to this new form 
of history—it is a closed circle, a realm without history. He repeatedly 
17 See Norbert Rath, Zweite Natur. Konzepte einer Vermittlung von Natur und Kultur 
in Anthropologie und Ästhetik um 1800, Münster 1996.
18 G. W. F. Hegel, Grundlagen der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatsrecht 
im Grundrisse (Werke, vol. 7), Frankfurt am Main 1970, p. 302; and Vorlesungen über 
die Philosophie der Geschichte (Werke, vol. 12), Frankfurt am Main 1970, p. 255.
19 F. W. J. Schelling, Philosophie der Mythologie (part 2) in Schellings Werke. Fünfter 
Ergänzungsband, Munich 1943, p. 10.
124 nlr 45
states that the creation was the result of the dialectical interplay of 
three Potenzen, powers or potencies that are three aspects of God: pure 
Seinkönnen (what-can-be) or the subject, pure Sein (being) or the object, 
and the subject-object that is the Geist. In the absolute, before creation, 
these potencies were latent; they were activated by an immemorial act, a 
transition from latent Wille (will) to active Wollen (wanting) around which 
Schelling’s late work circles.20 While these three powers and their dia-
lectical movements have their equivalents in Hegel’s thought, Schelling 
argues that Hegel’s dialectics remained merely logical, that Hegelian 
philosophy, starting from the idea, can never come to terms with the 
act of creation itself, nor with actual history.21 The third potency—that 
of Spirit, which is self-conscious Können or the complete manifestation 
of the subject in the object—triumphs in human consciousness. This is 
‘the end of nature’, the emergence of ‘a second world, the spiritual one’ 
in human consciousness, above nature.22
While Schelling’s Naturphilosophie stresses the progressive spiritualiza-
tion and thus the historicity of nature, this movement could only go 
so far; in the end, nature settled into cyclic patterns that were to be 
shattered by human history. However, Schelling still conceives of the 
theogonic process in the human mind—the gradual revelation of God 
in mythology—as a natural process, because it is a causal chain of events 
in that mind, rather than a direct divine revelation.23 In this respect his 
work reﬂects the developments of the early nineteenth century, when 
‘natural history’ became historical in the modern sense. When Schelling 
conceives of human history—as encapsulated in mythology—as natu-
ral history, he is applying the new paradigm to the former, even while 
downplaying the historicity of ‘ﬁrst nature’. Mythology as a succession 
20 The system of the three potencies is discussed and developed throughout the 
late Philosophie der Mythologie and Philosophie der Offenbarung, repeatedly given as 
lecture courses during the 1830s and 40s, and published posthumously. See for 
instance Philosophie der Offenbarung, in Schellings Werke, Sechster Ergänzungsband, 
Munich 1954, chapters 4, 5 and 8 (pp. 55–93, 147–74).
21 See the extensive criticism of Hegel delivered in the Berlin version of the lectures 
on Revelation, delivered in 1841–42, known through Paulus’s transcript, published 
as F. W. J. Schelling, Philosophie der Offenbarung 1841/42, Frankfurt am Main 1977, 
pp. 121–39.
22 Schelling, Philosophie der Offenbarung 1841/42, p. 107.
23 See F. W. J. Schelling, Philosophie der Mythologie (part 1), in Schellings Werke, Sechster 
Hauptband: Schriften zur Religionsphilosophie 1841–1854, Munich 1927, pp. 378–9.
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of gods, as historical polytheism, is shaped by the interplay of the three 
potencies, but these act now as purely natural causes. Man, he argues, 
wanted to rule freely over the three potencies, but instead came to be 
ruled by them. Slowly extracting himself from his fallen state, Man devel-
oped a mythology that enabled the human mind to rise to a level where, 
ﬁnally, he is ready for the true (Christian) Revelation. Schelling’s notion 
of second nature thus oscillated between the end of nature on the one 
hand, and on the other, the reassertion of nature in human history—a 
move conceived in terms of natural history, as a natural process.
Schelling’s parade of gods and mythologies—whose sequence is sup-
posed to reﬂect the successive dominance of the three potencies, 
leading up to the Revelation—may seem singularly irrelevant both to 
nineteenth-century and to present concerns; but he comes surprisingly 
close to Adorno in questioning the dichotomy of ahistorical myth/nature 
and ‘historical being’.24 For all its oneiric qualities, Schelling’s concept 
of second nature provides impulses for reﬂection: do not the ideologues 
of the free market effectively invoke a ‘second creation’ that causes this 
market and its political superstructure to develop in a quasi-autonomous 
way? The succession of mythologies has given way to economic logic; 
even those who are opposed to laissez-faire capitalism and favour some 
degree of regulation—for instance in the ﬁelds of biological research and 
climate control, like Fukuyama, Stern or Diamond—seem to buy into 
the naturalization of the current politico-economic order. Despite the 
fact that this regime has also given rise to a new unnatural history that 
ravages the planet, and created technologies that alter the substance of 
humanity itself, responses to these developments nonetheless remain 
within its bounds. Even if it leads in the end to both social and ecological 
collapse, two centuries of scientiﬁc and ﬁctional scenarios have made 
such an outcome seem familiar, or even acceptable.
Entropic resignation
The inevitability of the end of life has become a commonplace—notably 
through popular versions of the notion of entropy, as enshrined in the 
24 In arguing that ‘there is already an implicit historical dynamic in the great myths’, 
Adorno refers to Chronos killing Uranus and being himself dethroned by Zeus, a 
succession dear to Schelling. Adorno, ‘Idee der Naturgeschichte’, p. 363.
126 nlr 45
Second Law of Thermodynamics. As Rudolf Arnheim summarized this 
development in the early 1970s:
When it began to enter the public consciousness a century or so ago, it sug-
gested an apocalyptic vision of the course of events on Earth. The Second 
Law stated that the entropy of the world strives towards a maximum, which 
amounted to saying that the energy in the universe, although constant in 
amount, was subject to more and more dissipation and degradation. These 
terms had a distinctly negative ring. They were congenial to a pessimis-
tic mood of the times . . . According to Henry Adams’s witty treatise, The 
Degradation of the Democratic Dogma, ‘to the vulgar and ignorant historian 
it meant only that the ash heap was constantly increasing in size’. The sun 
was getting smaller, the Earth colder, and no day passed without the French 
or German newspapers ‘producing some uneasy discussion of supposed 
social decrepitude’.25
When Arnheim was writing this, the artist Robert Smithson was busy 
marshalling entropy behind his own anti-Idealist notion of history, in 
which minimalist sculpture, ruins, urban sprawl, natural disasters and 
strip mining are so many signs pointing towards an entropic end-time 
when ‘the whole universe will burn out and be transformed into an 
all-encompassing sameness’.26 Despite Smithson’s postmodern creden-
tials, Jennifer Roberts rightly argues that such a notion not so much 
resists as it naturalizes ‘the concept of a predetermined, eschatological 
history’, and that it provided Smithson ‘with a cosmic endorsement for 
his own aversion to activism, political or otherwise’.27 Smithson’s own 
monuments to this eagerly anticipated end-time—ranging from the 
unspectacular ‘monuments of Passaic’, described and depicted in his 
famous photo essay, to the ‘Spiral Jetty’—remain important. But they can 
also be seen as part of a questionable project of naturalization: natural 
history conceived on a grand scale as an inevitable decline and collapse, 
as a spectacle of destruction contemplated with joyful complicity.
In the Marxist spin on Hegelian conceptions of second nature, from 
Lukács to Guy Debord, ‘social habit’ as second nature came to be reinter-
preted as commodity fetishism and its ideological illusions. Debord 
25 Rudolf Arnheim, Entropy and Art: An Essay on Disorder and Order, Berkeley, ca 
1971, p. 9.
26 Robert Smithson, ‘Entropy and the New Monuments’ [1966], in Smithson, The 
Collected Writings, Berkeley, ca 1996, p. 11.
27 Jennifer Roberts, Mirror Travels: Robert Smithson and History, New Haven, ct and 
London 2004, p. 9.
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asserted that ‘the fetishistic, purely objective appearance of spectacular 
relations conceals the fact that they are relations among men and classes: 
a second nature seems to dominate our environment with its fatal laws.’ 
These quasi-natural ‘fatal laws’ can, on the one hand, appear thoroughly 
teleological and linear, an inevitable process in which people constantly 
have to adapt to progress; on the other hand, they can present them-
selves as an eternal return of economic growth and recession, of war and 
peace, of work and leisure. The tightly structured and compartmental-
ized time of the spectacle becomes, as Debord noted, ‘quasi-cyclical’, but 
this quasi-cyclical temporality is plotted on its other, the axis of fatalist 
progress, which is indistinguishable from ruin.28
Time and again Robert Smithson referred to dinosaurs and their extinc-
tion, lauding artists who illustrated deep-time episodes at the New York 
Planetarium and the Museum of Natural History for realizing in visual 
form ‘expendable “conceptions” of ultimate catastrophe, based on the 
more inaccessible regions of “space and time.” In their minds they have 
travelled into the forbidden zones, into the dazzling realms.’29 From an 
entropic point of view, the dinosaurs are very much present: we too are 
dinosaurs. Or are the dinosaurs just certain nations, certain classes? tv 
reports from hurricane-stricken New Orleans, the majority of whose 
struggling inhabitants were poor and black, suggested a future primeval 
landscape in which nature punishes those who have lost out in the eco-
nomic survival of the ﬁttest.
Overman returns
Foucault and others in his wake have characterized modern society 
as the regime of biopolitics. In older social formations, the biological 
human body was not as such the subject of politics; modern biopolitics 
involves the medicalization of the population, ensuring lower infant mor-
tality and an unprecedented level of health care.30 As the management 
of human bios, biopolitics is tendentially always the transformation of 
ﬁrst nature by second nature into something else: taking care of human 
nature imperceptibly becomes improving it, whether in a racist or an 
28 Guy Debord, La Société du Spectacle [1967], Paris 1992, pp. 26, 149–64.
29 Mel Bochner and Robert Smithson, ‘The Domain of the Great Bear’ [1966], in 
Smithson, Collected Writings, p. 33.
30 See in particular Michel Foucault, ‘Society Must Be Defended’: Lectures at the Collège 
de France 1975–1976, New York 2003.
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apparently more benign ideological context. It thus would seem that 
biopolitics involves a typically modern, progressive, linear approach to 
history: measures are taken to ensure a healthier and more productive—
and more manageable—population in the future. Yet the temporality of 
biopolitics can also bite its tail, in the form of dreamlike scenarios of a 
return to lost greatness.
Nietszche’s Übermensch was conceived as such a return. For Nietzsche, 
Darwin’s notion of natural selection was too deterministic: (human) 
nature is far more ﬂexible and amenable to artiﬁcial moulding. While 
modern society had created masses of paupers and proletarians, level-
ling hierarchies and eroding culture, the eternal return would ultimately 
lead to a reversal of this process, creating a new breed of sovereign aes-
thetes beyond Christian morality. However, nature may not work quickly 
enough, and Nietzsche entertained the fantasy of an elite that takes con-
trol of this eternal return. Disgusted by the second nature of historicist 
culture, by the oppression of life by a mania for the historical and the 
copying of the forms of ancient and non-Western cultures, Nietzsche 
stated that the Übermensch—himself an artiﬁcial creation—would act as 
‘a hothouse for strange and choice plants’.31 With this phrase he seems to 
come close to Huysmans, yet his vision of an artiﬁcial, unnatural nature 
is to an extent renaturalized by his recourse to tried and trusted models, 
even if these were not to be slavishly copied. As the result of an active 
intervention in the eternal circle, the Übermensch was to be a second or 
third coming of the Renaissance aristocrat and the antique Athenian, 
blissfully devoid of Christian morality.
The product of a breeding programme, Nietzsche’s overman is effectively 
a ﬁctitious form of third nature. Both Idealist and—to a lesser degree—
Marxist thinkers were reluctant to reﬂect on the transformation of ﬁrst 
nature by developments in science and technology. Second nature is not 
only a superstructure imposed on ﬁrst nature; it intervenes in it to gener-
ate the third nature of unnatural history. If second nature is becoming 
more and more ‘dematerialized’ due to information technology, leading 
to neo-Idealist visions of a clean and dematerialized capitalism—witness 
31 Friedrich Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente. Herbst 1887 bis März 1888, in 
Nietzsche, Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe, vol. 8, part 2, Berlin 1972, p. 90 [frag-
ment 153]. While Nietzsche frequently used the term Kultur in the now dominant 
sense, to refer to a society and its achievements (as in ‘Renaissance culture’), pas-
sages such as this remind us that the Latin cultura referred ﬁrst and foremost to 
agriculture and horticulture.
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the recent craze for companies to set up shop in Second Life, the much-
hyped and tellingly named online community—the rise of third nature 
is a stark reminder of the phantasmal character of such claims.32 In prin-
ciple, third nature is as old as human intervention in ﬁrst nature, but it 
has only become truly visible and thinkable with modern developments 
in science and technology—generating fantasies of an end to disease 
and even a triumph over mortality, while also leading to fears of ecocide. 
For the third nature of ecological collapse is the obverse of that of bio-
political improvement. Needless to say, its effects will not be fatal for 
those economic and genetic overmen who can afford the latest technol-
ogy to survive the Katrinas of the new nature.
The interrelationship between biopolitics and climate change had already 
been indicated, in a phantasmagorical register, by Charles Fourier in the 
early nineteenth century. Convinced that he had found ‘laws of attrac-
tion’ in the psychological realm to match those of Newton in the physical 
world, Fourier proceeded to propose a reform of society in accordance 
with these laws—with human nature. The association of free human 
beings in the Phalanstery would not only result in humanity attaining its 
true destiny, but also in changes in the natural environment. Fourier’s 
famous pronouncement that the ocean would be turned into lemonade 
is indicative of his extreme faith in the transformability of nature, pro-
vided human society is capable of mending its ways. In a stunning text 
on the ‘material deterioration of the planet’, he averred that the notice-
able cooling of the planet—there was indeed a series of extremely cold 
years in the early nineteenth century—was in apparent contrast with 
the expected warming of the climate due to industrial pollution.33 This 
strange, illogical course taken by nature could only be explained by the 
planet’s reaction to the sick and unnatural social order that prevailed: a 
social evolution in the Fourierist direction, by contrast, would effectively 
32 In a different use of the term ‘third nature’, McKenzie Wark in 2001 deﬁned it 
as ‘the transformation of both nature and second nature into an information land-
scape capable of controlling the process of transformation of nature into second 
nature’ (‘Spatial Discussions’, available at www.nettime.org). In restricting ‘second 
nature’ to material culture, and using ‘third nature’ to denote information techno-
logy, Wark seems to assent to quasi-Idealist 1990s’ constructions of the ‘New 
Economy’. I see no reason to distinguish information technology as such from 
second nature, though it certainly is a crucial factor in the transformation of ﬁrst 
and second nature into third nature.
33 Charles Fourier’s ‘Déterioration matérielle de la planète’, in René Schérer, 
ed., L’Écosophie de Charles Fourier. Deux textes inédits, Paris 2001, pp. 31–125.
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turn the world into a land of plenty. Grandville’s famous lampoon of 
Fourier’s utopia in a drawing depicting roasted birds falling from the sky 
does cruel justice to this aspect of Fourier’s writing. But his adoption of 
folk-utopian motifs also gives great force to his vision, and underlines 
the beneﬁts of radical change. In stark contrast to Gore or Diamond, 
Fourier argued that the entire social system needed to be changed for 
the planet to survive.
The biopolitical spectacle
Foucault was curtly dismissive of the suggestion that modern society 
may be a ‘society of the spectacle’, refusing even to mention Debord’s 
name. Rather, Foucault insisted that ‘we are much less Greeks than we 
believe. We are neither in the amphitheatre, nor on the stage, but in the 
panoptic machine, invested by its effects of power, which we bring to 
ourselves since we are part of its mechanism.’34 In his ﬁnal years, the 
notion of biopolitics came to complement and in part to displace the 
notion of discipline, the biopolitical administration of life now appearing 
as fundamental to both ‘democratic’ and ‘totalitarian’ forms of govern-
ment, a subtler as well as more radical and pervasive form of power. But 
Foucault, who identiﬁed the notion of spectacle with the public tortures 
and executions of the Ancien Régime, was hardly a discerning critic of 
the Debordian conception of the spectacle, based as it is on the reiﬁed 
representation of social relations in commodities. In the end, do not the 
biopolitical procedures theorized by Foucault end up absorbed by, and 
transformed into, spectacle? Just as forms of biopolitics have spectacular 
value—as in Kraft durch Freude, for instance—the spectacle increasingly 
becomes biopolitical, as exempliﬁed by the rise of plastic surgery.
Referring to Foucault’s late works, Bruno Latour remarked that modern 
society cannot be overthrown because it has been designed not to be; 
while this is strictly speaking little more than a sophism, as if the design-
ers’ intentions guaranteed success, the odds are not exactly favourable.35 
Any break will have to be forced from small cracks within the existing 
order, small mutations in its repetitious progress. Perhaps in this situ-
ation the grotesque ﬁgure of Mickey Cuvier, protagonist in a group of 
installations by the artist Mark Dion, can serve as a dysfunctional model 
34 Michel Foucault, Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison, Paris 1975, p. 253.
35 Bruno Latour, ‘Let the Dead (Revolutionaries) Bury the Dead’ (2006), available at 
www.bruno-latour.fr.
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of sorts. A blend of Mickey Mouse and the great taxonomist Georges 
Cuvier, who was involved in the early reconstruction and classiﬁcation 
of extinct animals shortly after 1800, this character—represented by a 
Mickey Mouse doll—presides over various study-like arrangements, 
including one called The Taxonomy of Non-Endangered Species (1990), 
with a shelf of preserve jars containing pop mutants like Pink Panther, 
Woody Woodpecker and Big Bird. Cuvier exploded the symbolic order 
of his day by means of a rigid taxonomy of extinct creatures, even while 
denying the evolution of species; Disney was the creator of a group of 
new artiﬁcial species. In melding the two in the ﬁgure of Mickey Cuvier, 
Dion has created an unnatural hybrid that is more than the sum of its 
parts, suggesting the need to question any ideologization of ﬁrst, second 
and third nature as immutable fate.
